Evaluating Repair Strategies for a Water-Treatment Facility using Arcade by Haverkort, B.R. et al.
Evaluating Repair Strategies for a Water-Treatment Facility using Arcade∗
B.R. Haverkort1,2 M. Kuntz3 A. Remke1 S. Roolvink1 M.I.A. Stoelinga1
1University of Twente, NL, 2Embedded Systems Institute, NL, 3University of Konstanz, D
Abstract
The performance and dependability of critical infras-
tructures, such as water-treatment facilities is essential. In
this paper we use various performance and dependability
measures to analyze a simplified model of a water treatment
facility. Building on the existing architectural framework
Arcade a model is derived in XML format and then auto-
matically mapped to the model checker PRISM. Using the
stochastic model checking capabilities that PRISM offers,
we compare different repair strategies, with respect to their
costs, system reliability, availability and survivability. For
this case study we conclude that using non-preemtive prior-
ity scheduling with additional repair crews is the best choice
with respect to performance, dependability and costs.
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, we have seen an increased aware-
ness in governments around the world about the vulnera-
bility and dependence of society on so-called critical in-
frastructures. For instance, the Dutch government has re-
cently identified 13 critical infrastructures [11]. Among
these is the electricity supply infrastructure (the power dis-
tribution grid and power generation), which is the research
topic of many projects. Another important critical infras-
tructure which is much less studied is water distribution and
water treatment. In this paper, we focus on the last four
phases of a water treatment facility; the key issue here is
that water companies need to provide their service of deliv-
ering high-quality water at all times. A recent survey in the
Netherlands found that water-treatment facilities, including
their embedded Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems, are highly vulnerable [10] to failures
and attacks. Therefore, the study of the impact of failures
(whether physical failures or cyber attacks) is of vital im-
portance.
To facilitate the analysis of performance and dependabil-
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ity requirements the dependability framework Arcade has
been introduced [5] which can be linked - unambiguously -
to existing design tools. Recently an XML-based input lan-
guage [9] has been introduced for Arcade. It has a precise
underlying semantics and, at the same time, can be coupled
easily to both design tools and analysis tools. Hence, this
approach pairs rigor with applicability and openness with
respect to true design tools.
In contrast to earlier dependability analysis with Ar-
cade, that analyzes reliability and availability only, here,
we propose a new performance measure called quantitative
survivability that is an refinement of survivability as defined
by Cloth et al. [7]. Survivability is defined there as the prob-
ability of timely recovery after the occurrence of predefined
disaster.
Throughout the paper, we analyze a simplified water
treatment facility. For this model we compare different re-
pair strategies with respect to their costs and their effect on
system reliability, availability and qualitative and quantita-
tive versions of survivability. Note that we are working with
a Dutch water company on a much more detailed model,
that however contains classified information.
The case study is modeled in terms of stochastic reac-
tive modules [1] instead of Input/Output Interactive Markov
chains(I/O-IMCs), as proposed in [5]. We implement a
translation from Arcade - XML to PRISM, tailored to the
need of our case study, instead of the mapping to CADP
that has been proposed earlier. Our choice for PRISM has
pragmatic reasons: to analyse the case study, we crucially
need stochastic model checking, to express the various per-
formability measures (survivability, repair cost, etc). Where
as PRISM supports the stochastic model checking of CSL
(continuous stochastic logic, [4]) and CSRL (Continuous
Stochastic Reward Logic, [6][3]), CADP does not provide
stochastic model checking capabilities.
There is a substantial existing body of work on the mod-
eling and analysis of critical infrastructures; for an overview
we refer the reader to [12]. However, most papers in the lit-
erature focus either on modeling, or combine modeling with
simulation. In contrast, we combine modeling with exact
analysis, based on stochastic model checking.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
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introduce the new tool chain in Section 2. The relevant mea-
sures are described in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the
watertreatment facility and in Section 5 we show its analysis
results. Finally, Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2 The modeling and analysis framework
The architectural framework Arcade has been shown
to be a very useful tool for modeling and analysis of per-
formance and dependability measures [5]. The framework
distinguishes three types of components: (1) Basic com-
ponents, which describe the components in terms of their
operational and failure behavior; (2) Repair units, which re-
pair components under their responsibility. (3) Spare man-
agement units, which activate spare components when their
primary is down. Inputs to the Arcade framework are: (1)
an architectural model, given in an XML format (based on
[9]), that describes the system in terms of basic components,
repair strategies, and spare management units (2) a fault tree
that describes when the system is down and (3) a depend-
ability measure specification.
For this case study, we add costs to the model to ex-
press, for example, the price of repair and focus on per-
formability measures like for example, survivability and in-
curred costs through repair. To enable the evaluation of var-
ious repair strategies w.r.t. their costs and the evaluation of
quantitative and qualitative survivability analysis, stochas-
tic model checking capabilities are needed. The original
Arcade tool chain (using the CADP tool [8]) does not
provide these. However, unlike CADP, PRISM supports
the stochastic model checking of CSL (continuous stochas-
tic logic, [4]) and CSRL (Continuous Stochastic Reward
Logic, [6]), which are essential for comparing costs and for
survivability analysis. Therefor, we choose to use Arcade
in combination with PRISM. Fig. 1 presents an overview
of our tool chain. Arcade translates its input to the In-
put/Output Interactive Markov chain model, whereas in this
paper we translate to the input language of the PRISM
model checker in CTMC mode. I/O-IMC are more expres-
sive than CTMCs, and the I/O-IMC parallel composition
differs semantically from those used in PRISM. Nonde-
terminism, present in I/O-IMC, is the distinguishing fea-
ture, and is needed for full Arcade. Nevertheless we made
sure that the two translations agree – in the sense that they
lead to identical results – for the constructs occuring in this
case study. These constructs are basic components, and/or
connectors, and different repair strategies: dedicated, first-
come-first-serve, fastest repair first, fastest failure first. If
two components have the same repair or failure rate, then
we apply first-come-first-serve. Notably, failures are as-
sured to never occur simultaneousy. Simultaneous failures
are a notorious source of nondeterminism, so their absence
is a prerequisite for applying the PRISM translation.
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Figure 1. The tool chain via PRISM
3 Measures of interest
In this section we define the measures of interest us-
ing the PRISM CSL/CSRL notation. Arcade uses a fault
tree to define when the system is down. This fault tree is
an AND/OR expression whose literals represent the failure
modes of the component [5].
Reliability, i.e. the continuity of correct service [2] is the
probability of having no system failure within a certain mis-
sion time t. While the statespace S contains all the states,
we define Sdown as the set of states of S where the fault tree
evaluates to 1. The set of operational states is defined as
Soperational = S \ Sdown. Reliability is then expressed as:
PReliability = 1 − PUnreliability , where PUnreliability =?
[true U<=t Sdown].
Availability, i.e., the long run probability that the sys-
tem is operational [2] assuming that components can be re-
paired: SAvailibility =? [Soperational].
Cloth et al.[7] define survivability as the ability of a sys-
tem to recover to a predefined service level in a timely man-
ner after the occurrence of disasters. Hence, we choose
the initial distribution such that model starts in the disaster.
Then, the probability that the system returns before time t to
a state where the required service is provided is expressed
as PRecovery =? [true U<=t Sservice]. Note that, Sservice
is a set of states where the required service is provided.
In classical dependability analysis service and failures
are expressed in a qualitative way. However, we introduce
a quantitative measure of service, called service level, that
can take a value from the interval [0, 1] and describes a frac-
tion of the maximum possible service.
To derive the quantitative service level, first the fault tree
is converted into a quantitative service tree by substituting
AND gates by OR gates and vice versa. Using the classi-
cal interpretation of the gates, the resulting service tree then
evaluates to 1 if still some form of service is delivered and
to 0 if the system is in a failure state. The quantitative inter-
pretation of gates is as follows.
Consider a gate with inputs x1, x2, . . . , xn. The quanti-
tative AND gate ANDq is the minimum of its inputs, i.e.,
ANDq(x1, . . . , xn) = min(x1, . . . , xn), (1)
and the quantitative OR gate ORq is the average of the in-
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puts and represents the fraction of available service, i.e.,
ORq(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑n
i=1 xi
n
. (2)
The service tree joins components that are connected in
series by an AND gate, as the failure of one of these com-
ponents is sufficient to disable service in that series. When
considering the quantitative interpretation, the component
with the minimum service forms the bottleneck of the sys-
tem and hence defines the service of the complete line. Re-
dundant components are connected by an OR gate, because
if one of these components remains working, service is still
delivered. However, the quantitative interpretation reflects
the service degradation that occurs if some of the compo-
nents that contribute to the overall service fail.
To compute the probability of reaching at least a service
level x ∈ [0, 1] all states for which the quantitative service
tree evaluates to at least x are added to the set Ssl(x).
Repair costs can be analyzed using rewards.
Instantaneous Cost yield the costs at a particular time
instant and can be expressed by the CSRL formula
Rinstantaneous =? [I = t].
Accumulated cost represent the total cost up to a given
time bound t and can be expressed by the CSRL formula
RAccumulated =? [C <= t].
4 Water-treatment facility: Description
We evaluated the availability, reliability, survivability
and repair costs of a water-treatment facility. Fig. 2 shows a
schematic representation of the water-treatment model. The
system consists of two independent process lines, each con-
sisting of a set of softening tanks, sand filters, pumps and a
reservoir. Softening tanks reduce the hardness of the water
by crystallizing the calcium, magnesium and certain other
elements. Sand filters remove the last remaining impurities
in the water, resulting in drinking water ready for consump-
tion. A reservoir is used for temporary storage to cope with
fluctuating water demands throughout the day. The pumps
transport the drinking water to the customer via a distri-
bution network. Line 1, consists of three softening tanks
(ST), three sand filters (SF), one reservoir (RES) and four
pumps (PUMP). For normal service, three pumps need to
be functioning and the fourth pump is a spare, indicated
by (3+1). The softening tanks and slow-sand filters are re-
dundant components, and to achieve normal service they all
have to be operational.
Line 2 consists of three Softening tanks, two Sand filters,
one Reservoir and three Pumps. In Line 2normal service
can be provided by two Pumps; the third Pump is a spare.
Again, the Softening tanks and Sand filters are redundant
components.
MTTF: 500 h
MTTR: 1 h
MTTF: 6000 h
MTTR: 12 h
MTTF: 1000 h
MTTR: 100 h
SoftenersSofteners Sand filtersSand filters Reservoir
eservoir
PumpsPu ps
SoftenersSofteners Sand filtersSand filters
Reservoireservoir
PumpsPu ps
(3) (3)
(1)
(3+1)
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(2) (1)
(2+1)
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MTTF: 2000 h
MTTR: 5 h
Figure 2. Water-treatment facility model
Line 1 Line 2
Strategy States Trans. States Trans.
Dedicated 2048 22528 512 4606
FRF-1 111809 388478 8129 25838
FRF-2 111809 500275 8129 33957
FFF-1 111809 367106 8129 23354
FFF-2 111809 478903 8129 31473
Table 1. State space for repair strategies.
In Fig. 2 the chosen Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) and
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) we use in our analysis are
shown below the components. The real rates are not shown
as they are classified. In our model all components can only
fail in one mode, and have only a single operational mode.
In this paper we consider repair strategies with a sin-
gle repair unit per line, that may contain several repair
crews. We compare the following repair strategies: dedi-
cated (DED), fastest repair first (FRF), fastest failure first
(FFF), with either one or two repair crews.
5 Water-treatment facility: Evaluation
In this section we show the analisys results for the Water-
treatment model as described in Section 4.
State space. Using the different repair strategies we get
very different state space sizes as shown in Table 1. Each
line of the system was seperately modelled to limit the state
space for the analysis. The state space size for FRF and
FFF does not change, if we have two instead of one repair
crew, only the number of transitions increases. The reason
for this is that the number of queue orders does not change,
but the added repair crew does change the number of ways
in which repairs are done.
Availability. The availability for Line 1, Aline1, and the
availability for Line 2, ALine2, are computed seperately.
The overall availability is then given by: ALine1∪ALine2 =
ALine1 +ALine2 −ALine1ALine2.
Table 2 shows the steady-state availability. Clearly ded-
icated (DED) repair provides the highest availability. The
strategies with two repair crews yield just a slightly lower
3
Strategy line 1 line 2 Combined
Dedicated 0.7442018 0.8186317 0.9536063
FRF-1 0.7225597 0.8101931 0.9473399
FRF-2 0.7439214 0.8186312 0.9535554
FFF-1 0.7273540 0.8120302 0.9487508
FFF-2 0.7440022 0.8186662 0.9535790
Table 2. Availability for repair strategies.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  200  400  600  800  1000
P r
o b
a b
i l i t
y  
( S
)
t in hours
Reliability line 1
Reliability line 2
Figure 3. Reliability over time
availability, while one repair crew yields a significantly
lower availability. Hence, we conclude that an additional
repair crew greatly increases the availability of the system.
Reliability. This measure does not consider repairs, hence
we do not distinguish between strategies. For the realiabil-
ity we defined Sdown as the set of states for which a process
line is not fully operational. Note that in each lines one
pump can fail for that line to be fully operational. In Fig.
3 the reliability of the water-treatment model is shown for
both lines. Even though Line 2 has less redundant compo-
nents it is more reliable than Line 1. This is because: (1) the
pumps have the shortest MTTF so they influence the relia-
bility the most, (2) the probability that 2 pumps fail in Line
1 is larger than for Line 2 because, Line 1 has four pumps
that can fail whereas Line 2 has only three, and (3) the other
phases still operate with only one component;
Survivability and Costs. We analyzed the survivability
of the water-treatment model after the occurrence of the fol-
lowing two disasters: (1) All pumps in the system fail, and
(2) in Line 2 two Pumps, one Softener, one Sand filter, and
the Reservoir fail.
We analyze the survivability for all possible service level
values of x ∈ [0, 1] given a disaster. From the results, we
conclude that for Disaster 1 the survivability results for all
repair strategies with one repair crew are the same and also
the repair strategies with two repair crews have the same
results. This is because for Disaster 1 only one sort of com-
ponent fails so, the repair order is the same for these repair
strategies. Therefore, we only show the results for Disaster
1 for FRF-1, FRF-2 and DED.
Because we consider Given Occurrence Of Disaster
(GOOD) models to analyze survivability, we do not know
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Figure 4. Survivability Line 1, Disaster 1, X1
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Figure 5. Survivability Line 1, Disaster 1, X2
the order in which components have failed. However, this is
important, as it defines the order in which components are
repaired. Hence we use the priority of components to define
the repair ordering.
For each of the repair strategies we compute the Instan-
taneous and Accumulated cost. For the accumulated cost
start observing the cost directly after the occurence of the
disaster. During normal operation the accumulated cost lin-
early increase according to the idle cost for the repair crews.
The instantaneous cost of a system during normal operation
is defined by the idle cost of the repair crews. After the
occurrence of a disaster the system has an increased instan-
taneous cost which decreases and converges to the instanta-
neous cost for the system during normal operation. In the
model each RU has an a cost of one per hour when idle
and cost of zero when working. For a BC a cost of zero is
applied when operational and three per hour when failed.
Line 1. From the numerical survivability results for Line
11, we conclude that there are three ranges for x of Ssl(x)
that give the same survivability results, namely: X1 =
[0.33, 0.66), X2 = [0.66, 1) and X3 = [1, 1]. The number
of different service-intervals results from the amount of re-
dundant componets in the different phases. Note, that spare
components do not create extra service-intervals.
Fig. 4 and 5 show the recovery to respectively service-
interval X1 and X2 after the occurrence of Disaster 1 for
the different repair strategies. In both figures we see that
the extra repair crew in FRF-2 increases the recovery speed
1The numerical results are not shown in this paper.
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Figure 6. Instantaneous cost Line 1, Disaster 1
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Figure 7. Accumulated cost Line 1, Disaster 1
compared to FRF-1. Also, DED has in both cases the fastest
recovery. For service interval X2 more components need to
be repaired than for X1. This corresponds to the slower
recovery to X2 compared to X1.
To analyze the trade off between recovery and induced
cost, Fig. 6 and 7 show the instantaneous and accumulated
cost for the same scenario. Because DED has a repair crew
for every component it always has the faster recovery, but it
also has the highest instantaneous cost. The instantaneous
cost for FRF-1 converges more slowly than FRF-2 and DED
because, only one repair crew performs repairs. Hence, the
number of components that need repairing decreases more
slowly. For FRF-2 the instantaneous cost converges more
slowly than DED which corresponds to the slower recovery
speed of FRF-2 show in Fig. 4 and 5. As the instantaneous
cost is the rate of increase of the accumulated cost we see
that DED also has the highest accumulated cost. Because
FRF-2 has, compared to FRF-1, a lower instantaneous cost
during the recovery it also has a lower accumulated cost.
We conclude that FRF-2 provides a good recovery after the
occurrence Disaster 1 while having a slightly lower cumu-
lated cost than FRF-1 during the recovery. We also con-
clude that indeed DED provides that fastest recovery for the
highest cost.
Line 2. In Line 2 the combination of three redundant soft-
eners with two redundant sandfilters and two redundant
pumps results in four service-intervals. Again, the spare
pump does not create extra service-intervals. We conclude
that four ranges for x of Ssl(x) give the same survivabil-
ity results, namely: X1 = [0.33, 0.5), X2 = [0.5, 0.66),
X3 = [0.66, 1) and X4 = [1, 1].
In Fig. 8 and 9 the recovery to service interval X1 and
X3 given the occurrence of Disaster 2 are shown. FFF-1
clearly provides the slowest recovery toX1. This is because
the Reservoir is repaired later in FFF-1 compared to FRF
or DED, and without the reservoir no service is possible.
While in service interval X1 FFF-1 and FFF-2 provide a
slower recovery than FRF-1 and FRF-2 in X3 this is the
other way. This is because for X3 the sand filter becomes
more important then the reservoir as it has a lower MTTF, a
higher MTTR and also without the sand filter X3 cannot be
reached.
To analyze the trade off between recovery and cost, we
show in Fig. 10 and 11 the instantaneous cost and the accu-
mulated cost after the occurrence of Disaster 2. FFF-1 has
the slowest convergence of the instantaneous cost, which
corresponds to the slow recovery. For X3 we see that FRF-
1 has a slightly slower recovery than FFF-1 which should
give FRF-1 a slower convergence of the instantaneous cost.
However, because FFF-1 has more repeated failures of fast
failing components (for example, a pump) it performs more
repairs and thus has a slower decreasing instantaneous cost.
When a component with a high MTTR is being repaired
by FFF-1 these repeated failures will even increase the in-
stantaneous cost as the number of failed components again
increases this can be seen in Figure 10. Because of the
slow instantaneous cost convergence of FFF-1 the accumu-
lated cost is also the highest. From the figures we conclude
Fastest Repair First with 2 repair crews is the best strategy
as it has the fastest recovery to X1 and the lowest accumu-
lated cost.
For Line 2 we conclude that DED provides the best sur-
vivability, but can only be used as a reference as it is unreal-
istic to use as it is to expensive and requires to many repair
units. We also conclude that using Faster Repair First in
combination with 2 repair crews is a very effective schedul-
ing algorithm. However, we also see that the priority of
components has a large impact on the recovery from a dis-
aster. Analyzing survivability with respect to different ser-
vice levels can help operators to select the ideal repair order.
We can also conclude from these results that instantaneous
costs can show the cost per repair strategy. Using accumu-
lated cost shows which repair strategy gives a higher costs
after a disaster. Using both survivability and costs will al-
low an operator to select a repair strategy that is both fast
and inexpensive.
6 Conclusions
We have modeled a simplified water treatment facility
using a subclass of the Arcade framework that has been
mapped to PRISM reactive modules. PRISM then allows
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Figure 9. Survivability Line 2, Disaster 2, X3
to automatically derive various performability measures for
the model including the introduced quantitative survivabil-
ity. This leads us to the following conclusions. First, our
analysis provides useful insights in the trade-offs between
costs and reliability, availability and, in particular, quan-
titative survivability. Also, these performability measures
are easy to express and compute using PRISM’s CSL and
CSRL model checking facilities. A problem we encoun-
tered is the fact that PRISM can only handle limited-size
models. To deal with larger models, we plan to apply min-
imization techniques, which have shown to yield drastic re-
ductions in the Arcade/CADP case [5].
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